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A:UDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MON'CANA)
at

BOSTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT, CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS
Monday, June 14, 1971, 10:00 a . m.

BEFORE THE BOOK IS CLOSED ON VIET NAM

It is a good place to he, today, here in this city
and at this University .
written a long time ago .

Boston is out of a chapter of liberty
Boston College is from a transcendent

~
experience of

love ~2,000

years old.

These two streams of human

enlightenment flow together in today's commencement.
There are young people here and old .

Whatever the

differences in our years, we are brought face-to- face by these
graduates.

While chronological gaps between the generations are

inevitable, credibility gaps are not pre-ordained .

I shall try

my best to avoid one in what I have to say to the class of 1971.
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My remarks will be directed to what we
common.

rRVP

in

Whatever we may not have, we have thP United States

in common and at a most difficult moment in history.
we are not passing through the best of times.

Clearly,

Clearly, this is

not freedom's finest hour.
Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older
generation for the present state of affairs.

Dn not look for

me, either, to blame the nation's plight on the young.

Young

people did not make the situation in which, together, we find
ourselves; they have not yet had that opportunity.
generations, it is to be

not~d

As for older

only that they have had time to

add to the mistakes which they inherited when they were younger.
So, I will not lead this commencement in a search
for scapegoats.

Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think

we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we may hope
to go from here.

These questions cannot be considered except in

the context of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam is a hook not yet closed.

- 3 I t is, this unfinished war, the roadblock to the fUture.

It

remains a funnel into which is drawn a great segment on the
nation's ideals, energies and expectations.
What has transpired in Viet Nam is a tragic story
told again and

agai~: ~~~n

three Presidents.

views have been placed before

They have been stated in public on many

oc casions during the past five years- and before.

For these

remarks, today, it is sufficient to note that fifty-five
thousand Americans are dead in Viet Nam, cut out of life at
an age not much different from that of this graduating class .
The wounded are three hundred thousand .

/.~~ Well over ' $100 billion

of public funds have been spent to support the war.

Before the

final reckoning (all the bills will not be paid until into the
next century), the cost undouhtedly will have doubled and
doubled again.
A large part of the national economy has been
diverted to support this venture in Southeast Asia .

What has

- 4 needed doing at home hy government has not heen done or not
done very well.

In the name of security against threats from

Viet Nam, the inner security of the nation has heen neglected.
We find ourselves, now with an economy that spurts
and sputters but seems not ahle to hold a reliable momentum.
Heavy unemployment is notahle, especially among young people
and returning veterans.

A persistent inflation plagues us

even as it erodes confidence in our currency ahroad.
We find ourselves, too, living uneasily in a badly
abused environment, with some scientists even dubious of the
capacity of air, water and

e~rth

to continue to sustain us.

Not only in pollution- control but in all public services-safety, transportation, education, sanitation, drug- regulation
and whatever- - shortcomings have been tolerated to the point of
breakdown.

The deterioration is especially serious in the

urban complexes where, together, with the unabated tensions
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A
of race and poverty, it casts a profound uncertainty over the
inner stability of the nation.
These problems cry out for concentrated public
attention.

They call fo r an input of young energy, new leader-

ship and fresh resources .
adequate supply.

It has not been forthcoming in

That it has not is due in no small part to

the diversions abroad.
Whatever may have led us into the conflict in
Southeast Asia, it is now clear that the involvement has hit
us where it hurts most-- in the nation's inner unity.

The war

opened with a President ial call for support of the Commanderin- Chief; it was met by a patriotic affirmation of national
unity.

Before the war is over , however, we will have gone

through deeper divisions than any since the Civil War.

In

the end, the restor ation of the nation's unity may well come
again only in the common revulsion with the war .

- 5 For the present, hhe involvement goes on.
the President has sharply cut back the U.

s.

Even as

troop levels in

Viet Nam--and he is to be commended for doing so-- the actual
involvement has spread from Viet Nam into Cambodia and Laos into
an all Indochina war. We remain deeply enmeshed.

We have yet

to extricate ourselves.
It is now apparent that even though we may have
thought to enter the war as welcomed liberators, circumstances
are otherwise.

We find, instead, that our policies have cast

us in the role of military arbitrator of a brutal conflict
which concerns other peoples.

We find, too, that the conflict

is not subject to resolution by the military intervention unless,
indeed, Indochina is to be "saved" by being "destroyed" utterly.
We know now what we did not know at the outset.
The involvement does not serve the interests of this nation or
the Vietnamese people.

- 6 That is the hitter reality of this frustrating
experience. : We have pursued a well- intentioned but impossible
dream.

In its pursuit, the lands and peoples of Indochina

have been torn and battered almost beyond recognition.
Americans have died in the tens of thousands.

c

Young

Vietnamese:

LA cf1 /J.NS ~

<) \ ~:..~-

A

""lo" men, women and children-- have died in the hundreds of thousands.
Three simple rice cultures--Viet Nam, Camhodia

~nd

Laos--have

been overwhelmP-d by the technology of modern warfare.
have fled the paddy fields, villages
the bombs and crossfire .
there to

liv~

~nd

Millions

hill- towns to escape

They huddle as refugees in the cities,

in one way or another--including the widespread

trafficking in heroin-- off the troops.

The swollen urban

populations are fed, in part, by imported rice paid for by
U. S. aid programs--ironically, in what is one of the richest
rice surplus areas of the world .

- 7 Why?

To what end?

fated enterprise?

What impelled us into this ill-

What keeps us in it?

How can we continue to

order young men to war in Indochina?
These a r e questions which cannot be put aside.
We have an obligation to clarify what we have been about in
Viet Nam.

That is an obligation which is owed to the living

generations as well as to the future.

It is a way of keeping

faith with the men whom we sent to Viet Nam and who have not
come back.

Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty,

this nation's historic purpose will emerge under the permanent
cloud of the war .

On the other kand, if an understanding of

the tragic experience assures that this is, indeed, the last
Viet Nam , then the sacrifices which have been asked will not
be without meaning .
It is pointless, in this connection, to try to
put the finger of responsibility on one President or another,
on one party or the other, on the Defense Department, the

- 8 State Department or some other .

We are all involved.

There

is no evading a national responsibility.
If the war is pursued, today, under a Republican
Administration, it is not to be forgotten that the military
escalation began under a Democratic Administration .

If there

are, now, Democratic Senators and Congressmen who seek to bring
the war to a close forthwith, there are also Repuhlicans whose
dedication is to the same purpose.

There are many who today

are disenchanted with the conflict; there were very few at the
outset, either Republicans or Democrats, who opposed the everdeepening involvement.

Indeed , who did not support or

acquiesce in it?
In short, Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of
partisan politics.

Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in

1969, 1966, 1964 or even 1961.

In my judgment, the present

involvement is a culmination of a foreign policy which was
born before this graduating class . n~

~.
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Parents here, today, will remember a great war and
its aftermath a quarter of a century ago.

They will remember

a tremendous military power assembled by a united people, a
power which overwhelmed a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.
This nation moved into the post- World War II era,
intact and dynamic in contrast with vast areas of the world
which lay in ruins around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt.
In the circumstances, the international leadership of the
United States was sought by friend and former enemy even as
it was opposed by the Soviet Union .

As we saw it, then, this

nation's economic strength was the only hope for the recovery
of what came to be called the "free world . '

As we saw it, too,

this nation's military supremacy, including an atomic monopoly,
was the principal bulwark against the aggressive spread of
what was termed "monolithic Communism. "
There began an era of foreign policy based on
those premises.

Tens of billions of dollars of materials,
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services and credits poured out of the United States into
other countries .

Aid went to Western Europe, to Asia, to

Latin America and eventually, to Africa.

In the name of the

United Nations, a war was fought and financed by this country
to hold back Communism in Korea .

We led the United Nations

into a boycott of the revolutionary Chinese People's Republic
and worked to exclude the Peking government from the world
community.

Multiple alliances were built which wove us into

a common NATO defense of Western Europe and linked us in some
sort of defense arrangements with about fifty nations.

Hundreds

of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, into military
garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and elsewhere.

Tens of

billions of dollars worth of construction, equipment and
weapons and nuclear warheads went with them .
These policies were devised in the name of
national security and world peace.

They were called accurately

bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual
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security program.

The fact is that the policies were and to

this day remain largely a one- sided effort of the United States.
They rest now as they have long rested on the rEadiness of this
nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost.
For years, there was little reason to question
these policies.

Congress was predisposed to accept the leader-

ship of the President during a period of cold war.

By the

same token, allied nations were predisposed to acoept the
leadership of the United States which alone had the capacity
to sustain this postwar system.
To be sure , there were flaws in the structure but
they were not readily visible in the exhuberance of the times.
In the first place, the security system relied so heavily on
military power to maintain peace that an undue burden of
responsibility was consigned to the Armed Services and an
excessive drain was attached to the national economy.

A zeal

for a new- found internationalism, moreover, led us, beyond
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essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into
an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world
either in the name of "fighting Communism 11 or "promoting
progress . "
tures

~r

This worldwide projection involved heavy expendi-

all kinds of aid- programs and the creation of elabor-

ate U. S. official establishments abroad.
prompted us to take on, as

~llies,

Moreover, it

a number of governments

who were dependents in all but name .

The great vitality of

the postwar economy also created an erroneous belief in its
~nexhaustibility.

Even as late as the onset of Viet Nam, we

proceeded as though the nation could have not only guns and
butter but also pay for fat and trtmmings .
We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with
little change for many years.

We pursued,them, however, in

a world which was changing greatly.
monopoly came to an end.

The nation's atomic

The myth of ''monolithic Communism"

disappeared in the political shifts of Eastern Europe and in

- 13 the upheaval in the Chinese- Soviet relationship.

Numerous

new states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as colonialism was being reduced to an historic relic.

Europe recovered

and went far beyond r ecovery to new heights of well- being .
New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany and Japan,
even as our own economy showed signs of overwork if not
exhaustion .
It was in these changeddrcumstances that we
became involved in Viet Nam.

We became involved for what

had long been accepted as highly worthwile ends.
involved in the name of r esisting "aggressive
the name of

11

We became

Communism~

Safeguarding international peace, 11

in

and in the

name of "honoring commitments 11 to a weak and dependent
government .
We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of
the same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had
gone into Korea a decade and a half earlier.

We did so,

- 14 however, almost as an habituated response, with far less
understanding of the actual situation in Indochina, unmindful
of the changes in this nation, in

As~.a

and in the world.

Viet Nam was a mistake , a traglc mistake .
To persist in it now is to add outrage to the
sacrifices of those who have suffer ed and who have died in
this conflict .
To

pers~t

in it now is to do violence to the

welfare of the nation .
The need is to terminate the mistake not to prolong
it .

No national commitments of this nation remain

charged to the governments in Indochina .

to be dis-

We have armed,

trained, financed and fought for those governments.

We have

done our share--far more than our share--to inject them with
the elements of survival .

What last ditch effort, as we are

withdrawing, is likely to do anything more?

Can the dragging

out of the withdrawal do other than add to the tragedy?

- 15 vfuat is needed forthwith is a redoubled effort to
terminate the military involvement.

What is needed is an end

to the further accumulation of casulaties, costs and prisoners
of war .

What is needed is to bring about the safe return of

U. S. forces and all prisoners of war.

And when the guns fall

still, what will be needed is to help restore the devastation
of the war.
So far as I can see, initiatives which might serve
these purposes have yet to he taken in the negotiations at
Paris.

It would be my hope, therefore, that the President

with the cooperation of the Senate would seek in some appropriate negotiating forum an Dnmediate cease-fire throughout
Indochina on the basis of:
1)

providing for a series of phased and

rapid U. S. withdrawals in return for a series of phased
releases of prisoners of war; and

~-~
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U. S. prisoners with the final withdrawl of all

u.

S. forces

by a specific date in the near future .

An agreement on this basis, it seems to me, could
act to close out this ill-fated

involvemen~.

It would also

bring about, I believe, the end of an era in the nation's
international relations.

Mistakes have been made during the

past quarter of a century in the conduct of these relations .
Do not think for a moment , however, that it has all been a
mistake .

Much that has been done had to be done, infue endur-

ing interests of this nation.

Much that is being done now needs

still to be done .
A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for
example, has been woven with the rest of the world.

It serves

for the mutual enrichment and contentment of hundreds of millions
of people .

By the same token, a sudden rupture of the web could

- 17 bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind.

We

have also begun to perceive in these twenty-five years, I
believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent
peace.

We have come, too, to a greater awareness of the signi-

ficance of human interdependency and mutual concern if the
world is ever to know stability.

Moreover, rudimentary

machinery which can give expression to that awareness is now
in existence.
It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter
aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to turn our backs on this
advance.

It would be a step backward if we were to veer from

what has been an excess of international involvement to an
extreme of disinvolvement.
I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it
is possible to withdraw from Viet Nam without seceding from
the world.

If we make that distinction--and I believe the
possible to
people of this nation will make it--then it should be/withdraw

- 18 militarily not only from Indochina but from the Southeast Asian
peninsula without abandoning our vital national interest in

j.

/..~~~ ...,, ~··

,.. +
~--qwhat transpires on the peripheryt of the Asian mainland .
It

__

'·~'·
t

•

~ '--

Similarly, we should be able to reduce sharply
the United States deployment of over half a million armed
forces and dependents in Western Europe a quarter of a century
after World

\olar

II without forsaking the essential mutual

pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

We should be

able, too, to exercise a firm and discriminating control over
the enormous expenditures which are made in the name of national
defense and, at the same time, still provide adequately for
the defense of the nation.

We should find it feasible to curb

the corruption and carelessness which have filtered into the
Armed Forces without demeaning and discouraging the millions
of dedicated men and women who wear the uniform .

We should be

capable of shutting down obsolescent and over- extended aid

- 19 programs without losing a human compassion for the other
people with whom we share the earth .
t~~~co

These adjustments involve, in
11

fv..+~,

the ~-.PresidentL f\ wo!"6 ~

lowering the profile 11 of the nation abroad.

If they are to be

made effectively, it seems to me that they must be accompanied
by a new and vigorous effort of American diplomacy.

That effort

should be aimed at securing agreements with other nations which
make international stability more dependent on mutual understandings and

undertakings and less on the unilateral commitment of

the military power of this or any other nation.

Such agreements

in the Far Pacific, for example, would have to involve not only
the United States and Japan, but also the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines and other nations .
In Eutope, a new and updated approach would presuppose a substantial shift of the burden of NATO from this
nation to Western Europe--a step which, incidentally, is long

t- ~~-r~ l
overdue and will be

pressed ~n

1

the Senate

until it is taken .
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I t will also call for agreements embracing both East and West
Europe and the anomolous situation at Berlin .
new approach to the security of Europe it might

Indeed, in a
be helpful if

the Soviet Union and this nation were to stand to the side for
a time and let the lead pass to the smaller European states on
bot h sides of the divide.

The efforts of the two super-powers

mi ght well be concentrated, instead, on ending the game of
musical chairs with regard to disarmament, mutual reductions
of their f or ces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons
which has been pursued for so many years .

In this connection,

s ome risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce
the ever-present and immediate risk of the collapse of human
c ivi lization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy.
I n matters of aid and assistance we will accept our share of
responsibility for the well- being of the world but it will be
a proportionately lower share than in the past and it will be
dis charged in cooperation with others.
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In short, in the era ahead, we wl ll get away from
the excess of unilateral internationalism which has characterized our policies for the past two decades and try to recast
our relations with others to the end that they are multilateral
in substance as well as in name, to the end that the common
burdens of the world are more equitably ahared.
This transition will derive from Presidential
leadership but not Executive fiat .

It will depenq,rather,

on a concerted effort in which the President is joined by
the Senate and the Congress , with each respectful of the
Constitutional

.,.~
the other.

sensibilities ~of

Most of all, it

will depend on a government which can be trusted by an informed
people because it is credible in what it says and does and
because it is alert and responsive to their needs .
You who graduate, today, and your counterparts
throughout the nation,loom large in what may be anticipated

"p~~

during the decades ahead.

~
You have the vote ~and, therefore,
/ P

,JLwtE\

~-·-

~~

~yo ~t::-~~
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are in a position to make your weight felt in the conduct of
the government.

That is a highly important aspect of your

role in shaping the nation's future .

Beyond it, however,

trere is the part which young people will have played in ending the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina .
That tragedy will be terminated; I would hope
that it will be terminated very soon.

The responsibility

for bringing it to an end rests heavily on those of us who
are the "old hands" of another generation .

To move beyond

Viet Nam into a future of peace will devolve just as heavily
on you .

To open a new era of constructive cooperation with

the rest of the human race, to act with compassion and with
high purpose, that is your opportunity, you who are the
"new hands" of tomorrow.
It is your nation.
of them all.

It is your life which lies ahead .

It is your world.

May you make the most

